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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1942, a twenty-one-year-old African-American woman named
Rosanell Eaton accomplished what was impossible for most Black people
in the Jim Crow South: she registered to vote.' It was not easy.
Ms. Eaton had to take a two-hour mule ride to reach the registrar and,
when she arrived, had to pass vigorous qualification tests, such as reciting
the Preamble to the Constitution from memory and taking a hand-written
literacy exam, before the registrar would allow her to join the voter rolls.2
In the Jim Crow South, white registrars commonly implemented addi-
tional, difficult-if-not-impossible-to-fulfill requirements simply because a
potential voter was African-American.3 Based on her own experience,
and that of many others like her, Ms. Eaton dedicated her life to voting
rights activism and successfully advocated for nearly seventy years before
experiencing a new kind of restrictive voting practice-stringent state
voter identification (voter ID) laws.4
As a result of the requirements set out by North Carolina's strict voter
ID law, Ms. Eaton was denied the right to vote in 2013.' In particular,
she was not able to vote because the name on her voter registration card,
"Rosanell Eaton," did not exactly match the name on her driver's license,
"Rosa Johnson Eaton."6 In 2015, Ms. Eaton, now ninety-four years old,
1. Ari Berman, The 94-Year-Old Civil-Rights Pioneer Who Is Now Challenging North
Carolina's Voter-ID Law, NATION (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.thenation.com/article/the-92-
year-old-civil-rights-pioneer-who-is-now-challenging-north-carolinas-voter-id-law [https://
perma.cc/7G33-8QDG] [hereinafter Berman, Pioneer].
2. Id.
3. See Jim Rutenberg, A Dream Undone, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 29, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/magazine/voting-rights-act-dream-undone.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/7DVQ-HHSV] (discussing the "arbitrary and obscure queries" imposed upon
black registered voters).
4. Berman, Pioneer, supra note 2; see Matthew Burns et al., Voting Changes Head to
Governor, WRAL (July 26, 2013), http://www.wral.com/voting-changes-head-to-governor/
12703982 [https://perma.cc/N584-CXZW] (reporting on the debate surrounding North Car-
olina's HB 589, a strict voting law passed along party lines).
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"undertook a herculean effort . . . to comply with the law."7 This effort
involved eleven trips to various state agencies over the course of a
month-requiring over 200 miles of driving and twenty hours of her
time.' The process was difficult enough for Ms. Eaton, who had the "per-
sistence, resources, and stamina" to satisfy the law's requirements, but
the task is much more onerous for those not so fortunate.9
The right to vote is the fundamental principle upon which democracy is
based."o Indeed, in an 1886 opinion, the Supreme Court declared the
right to vote a fundamental right because it is "preservative of all
rights."" However, early on in U.S. history certain groups of people,
such as African-Americans, women, and Native Americans, were com-
pletely excluded from exercising this right.12 In fact, even after the ratifi-
cation of the Fifteenth Amendment, which guaranteed African-
Americans the right to vote,1 3 efforts to disenfranchise African-Ameri-
cans persisted.14 Additional attempts to protect voting rights, such as the
Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871 and the Civil Rights Acts of 1950,
1957, and 1964, were either grossly ineffective or otherwise undermined




10. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969); see also Democracy, MERRIAM-
WFSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Democracy (last visited Feb. 2,
2017) [https://perma.cc/8H7H-ZD9M] (defining democracy as "a form of government in
which people choose leaders by voting").
11. Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
12. See Steven Mintz, Winning the Vote: A History of Voting Rights, GILDER LEiR-
MAN INST. AM. HIsT., https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/government-and-civ-
ics/essays/winning-vote-history-voting-rights (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
6VSH-SKHL] (asserting that, with few exceptions, adult White men were the only people
who could vote in the years following the formation of the United States).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 1; see also Passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/grant-fifteenth (last
visited Feb. 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/MFB5-24CV] (emphasizing how White Southerners
responded to the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment by finding ways to prevent Afri-
can-Americans from voting, including the use of violence).
14. See Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and
the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 84 (2008) (contending
that, as African-American men began to exercise the right to vote in the wake of the Fif-
teenth Amendment's passage, a "counterrevolution began with the suppression of the Af-
rican-American vote through force and fraud").
15. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966) (discussing how the
Enforcement Act of 1870, which Congress passed as an attempt to help implement the
Fifteenth Amendment, ended up being ineffectual after the intensity of the racial equality
debate waned and was eventually repealed), abrogated by Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S.
- 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Hayley Trahan-Liptak, Prohibiting Barriers to the Booth: The
Case for Limited Nationwide Preclearance Under a Modified Voting Rights Act, 34 B.C. J.L.
2192017]
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tion to mounting pressure from the Civil Rights Movement, led to the
passage of a revolutionary federal law aimed at protecting minority vot-
ing rights: the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). 1 6
Within a few years of its enactment, the VRA-especially the
preclearance regime of sections 4(b) and 5-was enormously successful at
curbing discriminatory voting laws and practices and increasing minority
voter turn-out and representation.17 The VRA continued to do so for
nearly fifty years" before experiencing its death throes at the hands of a
bitterly-divided Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder (Shelby).19
That is, by striking down section 4's "coverage formula," the Court ren-
dered the VRA's most effective tool-the preclearance regime-a nul-
lity. 2 0 Without the VRA's preclearance regime, jurisdictions formerly
subject to federal preclearance, such as Texas, Alabama, and parts of
North Carolina, have carte blanche to implement restrictive voting laws
with the purported aim of combatting "voter fraud" even though there is
& Soc. JUST. 151, 159 (2014) (discussing how the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964
did little to alleviate the concern of minority disenfranchisement).
16. See Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 903, 912 (2008) (stating the events of "Bloody Sunday" prompted President Johnson
to ask for the toughest voting rights bill imaginable, which he received in the form of the
VRA); Orville Vernon Burton, Tempering Society's Looking Glass: Correcting Misconcep-
tions About the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Securing American Democracy, 76 LA. L.
REV. 1, 17 (2015) (referring to the VRA as "an essential component of the vision of the
Civil Rights Movement").
17. See Conner Johnston, Comment, Proportional Voting Through the Elections
Clause: Protecting Voting Rights Post-Shelby County, 62 UCLA L. REV. 236, 241 (2015)
(referring to the preclearance requirements of section 4(b) and section 5 as "the heart of
the VRA"); Brian F. Jordan, Note, Finding Life in Hurricane Shelby: Reviving the Voting
Rights Act by Reforming Section 3 Preclearance, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 969, 976-77 (2014) (high-
lighting section 5's "great success" in fighting minority disenfranchisement).
18. The Effect of the Voting Rights Act, EPIC.ORG, https://epic.org/privacy/voting/regis-
ter/intro c.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6CGF-SRPG]. See generally
Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black Repre-
sentation in Southern State Legislatures, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 111 (1991) (examining the
reasons for the dramatic increase in the number of African-American legislators in the
South and concluding that such increase was the direct result of the VRA).
19. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (ruling in a 5-4
decision that Congress's failure to update section 4(b)'s coverage formula during the
VRA's 2006 Reauthorization rendered the section unconstitutional because the data Con-
gress used did not speak to "current conditions"); see also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court
Invalidates Key Part of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMEs (June 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/06/26/us/supreme-court-ruling.html [https://perma.cc/5K9Y-JWB3] (discussing
the Shelby decision).
20. Ian Vandewalker & Keith Gunnar Bentele, Vulnerability in Numbers: Racial Com-
position of the Electorate, Voter Suppression, and the Voting Rights Act, 18 HARV. LATINO
L. REV. 99, 103 (2015).
220 [Vol. 19:217
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no evidence such fraud exists.2 1 The ruling in Shelby, coupled with the
fact that, in the past, courts have upheld state voting laws passed with the
purported aim of preventing voter fraud,22 means those challenging such
laws face an arduous task.23
The post-Shelby landscape is defined by the proliferation of restrictive
voting laws passed in the name of preventing voter fraud-almost all of
which have originated in Republican-controlled state legislatures.2 4 Ad-
ditionally, partisan gridlock prevents Congress from taking bipartisan
measures to protect voting rights, such as passing a renewed VRA or up-
dating section 4(b)'s coverage formula.2 5 Meanwhile, utilizing the VRA
provisions the Shelby decision left unaffected, sections 2 and 3, presents
21. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 17, at 989-91 (outlining the restrictive voting laws
passed in Texas and North Carolina following the Court's Shelby decision); Brendan
Nyhan, Voter Fraud is Rare, but Myth is Widespread, N.Y. TiMrEs (June 10, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/upshot/vote-fraud-is-rare-but-myth-is-widespread.html?_- r=O
[https://perma.cc/49SK-UWD9] (claiming there is no evidence of widespread "in-person"
voting fraud); JuSTIN LEvrrT, Tiu TRUTU ABOUT VOTER FRAUD, 4-11 (2007), https://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/The%20Truth%20About%20Voter%20
Fraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZG2-D3ZS] (concluding that allegations of widespread voter
fraud have no basis in reality); see also Editorial Board, Alabama Puts Up More Hurdles
for Voters, N.Y. TIms (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/opinion/ala
bama-puts-up-more-hurdles-for-voters.html? r=0 [https://perma.ccl8773-5DVRI (stating
Alabama officials announced their decision to enforce the state's stringent voter ID law on
the day of the Shelby ruling).
22. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 181 (2008) (upholding an
Indiana voter ID law in part because the Court considered preventing in-person voter
fraud a legitimate state interest that justified a limited burden on voting rights); Frank v.
Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding a Wisconsin voter ID law did not violate
section 2 of the VRA or the Constitution).
23. See Emily DeRuy, Will the Strictest Voter ID Law Survive a Battle with Civil Rights
Advocates?, FUsION (Apr. 28, 2015, 6:18 AM), http://fusion.net/story/127047/will-the-strict
est-voter-id-law-survive-a-battle-with-civil-rights-advocates [https://perma.cc/V5WZ-
3CNR] (referring to civil rights advocates' fight against strict voter ID laws as an "uphill
battle" in the wake of the Crawford and Shelby decisions).
24. See Vincent Marinaccio, Comment, Protecting Voters' Rights: The Aftermath of
Shelby v. Holder, 35 WHrITTER L. REV. 531, 542-43 (2014) (listing state voting laws passed
in formerly covered jurisdictions after the Shelby decision); Kara Brandeisky et al., Every-
thing That's Happened Since Supreme Court Ruled on Voting Rights Act, PRo PUBLICA
(Nov. 4, 2014, 11:31 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/voting-rights-by-state-map
[https://perma.cc/9RXE-8HPA] (describing the numerous voting laws passed across the
country in the wake of the Shelby decision).
25. See Marinaccio, supra note 24, at 547 (emphasizing "legal experts ... have little
hope that Republicans will approve any method of preserving [the VRA's preclearance
regime]"); see also Ari Berman, Congressional Democrats Launch a New Strategy to Re-
store the Voting Rights Act, NATION (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/con-
gressional-democrats-launch-a-new-strategy-to-restore-the-voting-rights-act [https://perma
.cc/4U4X-V5JX] (pointing out that, while a Democrat-backed bill aimed at restoring the
VRA has one Republican co-sponsor, "few Republicans have followed").
2017] 221
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difficulties of its own: the former requires taking on the inherent costs
and limitations of case-by-case litigation26 while the latter requires chal-
lengers to prove discriminatory intent on behalf of lawmakers, a near-
impossible task.27
Thus, the tools voting rights advocates currently have at their disposal
to combat restrictive post-Shelby voting laws are simply not enough to
protect the franchise-the very foundation upon which our system of
government is based. Instead of relying solely on the remaining provi-
sions of the VRA, advocates should also adopt a universalist approach
toward protecting voting rights. For example, they should push for auto-
matic voter registration, online voting, and expanding early voting at the
state level while pressuring Congress to use their Elections Clause power
to make it easier to vote in federal elections.
Part II provides an overview of the history and "Hydra-like"2 8 quality
of discriminatory and suppressive voting laws and practices and the de-
velopments that led to the VRA's passage. Part III outlines the VRA's
successes and the controversial path to its undoing in the Supreme
Court's Shelby decision. Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court's disastrous
ruling in Shelby. Part V provides an overview of the status quo, termed
the "post-Shelby landscape." Part VI describes the tools voting rights ad-
vocates currently have at their disposal and argues that such tools alone
are insufficient to protect the franchise in the post-Shelby landscape. Fi-
nally, Part VII makes the case for why advocates can strengthen their
ability to protect the franchise by adopting universalism at the state and
federal level.
26. See Penda D. Hair, Lawsuits Are Not Enough: Restore the Voting Rights Act,
HILL (July 9, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/247283-
lawsuits-are-not-enough-restore-the-voting-rights-act [h tps://perma.cc/TWA7-TZ78] (con-
tending section 2 litigation "requires vast amounts of resources, time, and constant vigi-
lance"); Jim Sensenbrenner, Sensenbrenner: Protect Our Right to Vote, USA TODAY
(Mar. 20, 2014, 5:52 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/03/20/sensenbren-
ner-voting-rights-government-column/6490847 [https://perma.cc/SR6F-HRVU] (referring
to section 2 litigation as "costly, difficult to prove," and often leaving "no remedy for a
flawed election").
27. See Abby Rapoport, Get to Know Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act, AM. PROS-
PECT (Aug. 19, 2013), http://prospect.orglarticle/get-know-section-3-voting-rights-act
[https://perma.cc/UW54-AVE8] (explaining why proving section 3's discriminatory intent
requirement makes successful claims difficult to pursue).
28. In her Shelby dissent, Justice Ginsburg likened the nature of voter suppression
legislation to the Hydra, an infamous creature in Greek mythology. Shelby Ct. v. Holder,
570 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2633 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Hydra infamously
bore nine heads and would spawn two more heads every time the hero cut one off. Hydra,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Hydra (last visited
Jan. 31, 2017) [https://perma.cc/46QB-CN4F].
222 [Vol. 19:217
6
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 19 [2020], No. 2, Art. 3
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol19/iss2/3
NAVIGATING THE POST-SHELBY LANDSCAPE
II. THE "HYDRA-LIKE" QUALITY OF DISCRIMINATORY VOTING LAWS
AND THE DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE VRA's PASSAGE
After the Civil War, Congress amended the Constitution to allow for
legislation protecting the civil and political rights of the newly-freed Afri-
can-American population.29 In particular, the Fifteenth Amendment,
which provides that U.S. citizens' right to vote could not be "denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude,"o was immediately successful at protect-
ing African-American suffrage and electing Black citizens to public of-
fice." In parts of the South, for example, African-Americans began to
hold high offices in state legislatures, and white Republican candidates
sought the support of African-American voters.3 2 Nevertheless, as Black
citizens continued to exercise their newly-acquired voting rights, White
Southerners, threatened by such an exercise of power, initiated a plan to
suppress votes by using threats, violence, and fraud." On a daily basis,
White Southerners, especially the Ku Klux Klan, terrorized Black citi-
zens, Black politicians, and any of their white supporters-assaulting or
murdering countless citizens.3 4 In addition, those opposed to African-
American suffrage committed outright voting fraud by stealing ballot
boxes and exchanging them with others, removing polls to unknown
places, purging voter rolls, and making illegal arrests the day before
elections.
Congress responded to the violence, intimidation, and fraud used to
suppress African-American's voting rights with the Enforcement Act of
1870.36 The Enforcement Act of 1870 made it a crime for public officers
and private individuals to obstruct the right of African-Americans to
29. See Gilda R. Daniels, Unfinished Business: Protecting Voting Rights in the Twenty-
First Century, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1928, 1935 (2013) ("The Civil War Amendments ...
grant[ed] Congress the authority to pass legislation that would preserve the right [of newly-
freed African-Americans] to participate in the franchise."); see also Chin & Wagner, supra
note 14, at 80 (discussing the advances formerly-enslaved African-Americans enjoyed im-
mediately following the ratification of the Civil War Amendments).
30. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1.
31. Trahan-Liptak, supra note 15, at 158.
32. Chin & Wagner, supra note 14, at 82-83.
33. Id. at 87-88; Anthony J. Gaughan, Has the South Changed? Shelby County and the
Expansion of the Voter ID Battlefield, 19 TEx. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 109, 114 (2013); Trahan-
Liptak, supra note 15, at 158.
34. Chin & Wagner, supra note 14, at 88.
35. Id. at 87-88.
36. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); Frederick M. Lawrence,
Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L.
REv. 2113, 2136-38 (1993).
2017] 223
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vote.3 However, despite such Congressional action, the Ku Klux Klan
and other racist vigilante groups continued to terrorize African-American
communities in the South. Once again, Congress responded by passing
legislation aimed at protecting African-American voting rights: the En-
forcement Act of 1871 (also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act).3 9 Unfortu-
nately, toward the end of Reconstruction hope of African-American
equality at the polls and enthusiasm for civil rights dwindled, making it
even easier for the federalist-leaning Supreme Court to chip away at Con-
gress's Reconstruction Era civil rights legislation.40 What is more, not
only did racist vigilante groups and a Supreme Court averse to the federal
government effectively curtail African-American's voting rights, state
legislatures also took subtle steps toward doing so.4 1
In the years following Reconstruction, Southern state legislatures be-
gan enacting measures drafted with the intent of passing constitutional
muster while effectively disenfranchising African-Americans.42 Such
measures included poll taxes and literacy tests-the former passed know-
ing that most African-Americans could not afford to pay the taX43 and the
latter passed knowing that over two-thirds of the adult "Negroes" were
illiterate at that time.' Simultaneously, Southern legislatures found ways
to assure these measures would not disenfranchise poor or illiterate
whites, including the use of grandfather clauses, property qualifications,
and "good character" tests.45
37. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty.
v. Holder, 570 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
38. Lawrence, supra note 36, at 2140-41.
39. Id.
40. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310 (discussing how the Enforcement Act of 1870 and
its subsequent amendments, which Congress passed as an attempt to help implement the
Fifteenth Amendment, ended up being ineffectual after the intensity of the racial equality
debate waned and were eventually repealed for the most part); see also Ken Gormley,
Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3),
64 TEx. L. REV. 527, 541 (1985) (explaining how the Supreme Court undid much of the
federal civil rights legislation passed during Reconstruction).
41. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310-11 (discussing post-Reconstruction Era attempts
to disenfranchise African-Americans); see also UNIV. OF Micii., Race, Voting Rights, and
Segregation: Direct Disenfranchisement, UMICH.EDU, http://www.umich.edu/-lawrace/dis-
enfranchisel.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6YC4-E8F7] (providing an
overview of "direct" disenfranchisement echniques used in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries).
42. Chin & Wagner, supra note 14, at 90.
43. UNIV. OF MiCH., supra note 41.
44. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 311.
45. Id. "Grandfather clauses" allowed those who would otherwise be disqualified
from voting by literacy tests, poll taxes, and other devices to do so if they were able to vote
before the Civil War. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 356 (1915).
224 [Vol. 19:217
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In the early 20th century, various civil rights groups challenged the con-
stitutionality of the devices and tests state legislatures employed, achiev-
ing limited success.46 Further, any success advocates enjoyed was often
fleeting, as state legislatures drafted new methods of disenfranchising vot-
ers to get around adverse court rulings,47 and the Supreme Court de-
ferred to state legislatures regarding voting.4 8 Subsequent attempts in the
mid-20th century, such as the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 fared no
better. Despite providing the Attorney General with various tools to
combat discriminatory voting laws and practices, the case-by-case litiga-
tion approach the federal government utilized was, in the words of the
Supreme Court, "unusually onerous to prepare . . . sometimes requiring
as many as 6,000 man-hours" to prepare and litigate.4 9 Title I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which attempted to establish a three-judge panel to
hear expedited voting cases and outlaw some racially discriminatory vot-
ing practices in federal elections, was ineffective for the same reasons.so
This pattern of state legislatures sprouting new laws to suppress minor-
ity voting, after acts of Congress or judicial rulings undermined prior at-
tempts, led Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to proclaim that "[e]arly
attempts to cope with this vile infection [of discriminatory voting laws
46. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 536 (1927) (holding a Texas law disallowing
African-Americans from voting in the Texas Democratic Primary violated the Fourteenth
Amendment); Guinn, 238 U.S. at 347 (1915) (striking down a grandfather clause in the
Oklahoma constitution as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment).
47. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939) (striking down an Oklahoma statute
passed to sidestep the Court's previous holding that Oklahoma's grandfather clause was
unconstitutional); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (holding that Texas's all-White
Democratic primaries violated the Fourteenth Amendment despite Texas's efforts to cir-
cumvent the Supreme Court's previous decision by repealing the previous law and passing
another that gave political parties the power to set their own rules); see also Gaughan,
supra note 33, at 114-15 (providing an overview of efforts on behalf of Southern Whites to
undermine any progress made in the realm of minority voting rights up until the passage of
the VRA); Jordan, supra note 17, at 974 (describing how Southern states found ways to
evade Congressional action on minority voting rights, including the adoption of literacy
tests, poll taxes, or restricting access to voter registration).
48. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton Co. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 45 (1959)
(upholding North Carolina county's literacy test requirement as a legitimate exercise of
state power if it was applied without regard for race); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213,
213 (1898) (upholding Mississippi constitutional provisions relating to poll taxes and liter-
acy tests because the requirements applied to all voters).
49. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1966), abrogated by Shelby
Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); accord Daniels, supra note 29, at 1936
n.36 (pointing out how the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 were ineffective and lacked
workable enforcement provisions); Trahan-Liptak, supra note 15, at 159 (discussing how
the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 did little to alleviate the concern of minority
disenfranchisement).
50. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313-14.
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and practices] resembled battling the Hydra [because] [w]henever one
form of voting discrimination was identified and prohibited, others
sprang up in its place."5 1
In addition to previously ineffectual congressional action, judicial un-
willingness to intervene in voting rights cases, and blatant disenfranchise-
ment of Black voters,52 the passage of the VRA was a direct result of the
political pressure placed on Congress by the large and growing Civil
Rights Movement.5 3 Particularly galvanizing was the widely-televised
atrocity known as "Bloody Sunday."54 On that fateful day, Alabama
state troopers brutalized civil rights advocates-most of whom were Afri-
can-American-while they marched from Selma to Montgomery to pro-
test the killing of a young African-American man who protected his
mother from being beaten at an earlier voter registration march.5 5
Within five months, President Lyndon Baines Johnson signed the VRA
into law, 5 and would later describe the VRA as "a triumph for freedom
as huge as any victory that has ever been won on any battlefield."5 7
III. TH-E VRA's SUCCESS AND THE CONTROVERSIAL PATH TO ITS
DEMISE IN THE SUPREME COURT'S SHELBY DECISION
Although the VRA contained effective tools to combat discriminatory
voting laws, such as banning the use of any test or device as a prerequisite
51. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2633 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
52. See Pitts, supra note 16, at 909 (asserting the VRA "represented the federal gov-
ernment's holistic response to Southern electoral atrocities"); Trahan-Liptak, supra note
15, at 159 (pointing out Congress passed the VRA as a response to States' continued ef-
forts to disenfranchise African-American voters); see also Cody Gray, Savior Through Sev-
erance: A Litigation-Based Response to Shelby County v. Holder, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 49, 57 (2015) (claiming the VRA "followed several unsuccessful attempts" to combat
discrimination in voting).
53. See Burton, supra note 16 (referring to the VRA as "an essential component of
the vision of the Civil Rights Movement"); Daniels, supra note 29, at 1936 (attributing the
passage of the VRA to the Civil Rights Movement).
54. See Pitts, supra note 16, at 912 (stating the widespread telecast of "Bloody Sun-
day" prompted President Johnson to ask for the toughest voting rights bill imaginable,
which he received in the form of the VRA); see also Burton, supra note 16, at 23-24 (high-
lighting the media's role in placing an impetus on Congress to take action to protect minor-
ity voting rights).
55. Terrye Conroy, The Voting Rights Act of 1965 A Selected Annotated Bibliography,
98 L. LIBR. J. 663, 664 (2006).
56. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)); Conroy, supra note 55.
57. Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act (Aug. 6,
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for voting or voter registration 58 and authorizing federal examiners to
oversee local elections,5 9 its strongest weapon was the preclearance re-
gime of sections 4(b) and 5.6o Congress implemented the preclearance
regime as a response to the "continual litigation" problem the Supreme
Court expressed in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.61 Preclearance worked
as follows: section 4(b) provided the formula to determine which jurisdic-
tions were subject to preclearance,6 2 while section 5 prohibited such "cov-
ered" jurisdictions from enforcing voting laws without first obtaining
preclearance from either the U.S. Attorney General or a three-judge
panel from the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia.63 A
jurisdiction was considered "covered," and thus subject to preclearance
requirements if: (1) it employed any test or device that limited a person's
ability to register to vote on or before November 1, 1964; (2) less than
50% of the voting-age population was registered to vote on November 1,
1964; or (3) less than 50% of eligible voters participated in the November
1964 presidential election." In the years immediately following the pas-
sage of the VRA, these preclearance provisions proved to be just as con-
troversial65 as they were enormously successful.6 6 For instance, under the
preclearance regime "African-American voter registration in Mississippi
rose from 7% in 1964 to approximately 60% in 196667 and by an astound-
ing 886% between 1964 and 1976.",68 Additionally, during the first ten
years of the VRA's enforcement, 14.2% of the 1,542 voting changes sent
to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preclearance were struck down.69
Despite the fact that the VRA also provided "bail-out" procedures al-
lowing covered jurisdictions to file for an exemption if certain require-
58. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2012)).
59. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 440 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b-c (2012)).
60. See Johnston, supra note 17 (referring to section 4 as "the heart of the VRA"); see
also Gaughan, supra note 33, at 115 (stating that sections 4(b) and 5 were "[t]he corner-
stone of the VRA").
61. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1966), abrogated by Shelby
Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); accord Trahan-Liptak, supra note 15, at
161 ("Congress responded to the problem of continual litigation with section 5.").
62. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438-39 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b-c (2012)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, 1965-2007, 86 TEx. L. REV. 670, 672 (2008).
66. See Gaughan, supra note 33, at 116 (outlining the VRA's immediate successes).
67. Id.
68. Trahan-Liptak, supra note 15, at 163.
69. Id. at 164.
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ments were met,7 0 the controversy surrounding the VRA centered on the
preclearance regime's interference with a power traditionally relegated to
the states-the enactment of voting laws." Indeed, the first time the Su-
preme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the VRA, the main issue
regarded whether Congress overstepped its constitutional authority to ef-
fectuate the Fifteenth Amendment by "appropriate" measures.7 2 Claim-
ing the preclearance provisions impermissibly violated the principle of
equal sovereignty of the states, South Carolina urged the Court to enjoin
the challenged sections. Although South Carolina challenged multiple
sections of the VRA, the Court zeroed in on the coverage formula be-
cause it was the provision to which South Carolina was actually sub-
jected.74 Ultimately, the Court resoundingly upheld the constitutionality
of the challenged sections, stating:
After enduring nearly a century of widespread resistance to the Fif-
teenth Amendment, Congress has marshalled an array of potent
weapons against the evil [of voting discrimination], with authority in
the Attorney General to employ them effectively. . . . We here hold
that the portions of the Voting Rights Act properly before us are a
valid means for carrying out the comments of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. Hopefully, millions of non-white Americans will now be able
to participate for the first time on an equal basis in the government
under which they live.
Any celebration on behalf of minority voting rights advocates was
short-lived, however, as the VRA, particularly the preclearance regime of
sections 4(b) and 5, continued to be extremely contentious in the decades
that followed.7 6
70. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438-39 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b-c (2012)). The covered states or jurisdictions had to
demonstrate that they had complied with the VRA's requirements for at least ten years
and that they had taken positive steps to broaden the electorate. Id. For a discussion of
the "bail-out" provisions under sections 4(b) and 5, see infra Part III.
71. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty.
v. Holder, 570 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
72. Id. at 308.
73. Id. at 307, 323.
74. Id. at 317.
75. Id. at 337.
76. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Dist., 528 U.S. 320, 321 (2000) (holding sec-
tion 5 of the VRA does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a
discriminatory but non-retrogressive purpose); Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 10
(1996) (determining a district court may not issue an order authorizing a jurisdiction sub-
ject to section 5 of the VRA's preclearance requirements to conduct judicial elections
under a plan which has not received federal preclearance); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S.
130, 130 (1976) (upholding a New Orleans reapportionment plan challenged under section
228 [Vol. 19:217
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Section 5 was initially intended to expire after five years, but Congress
reauthorized and extended it on several occasions: in 1970, 1975, 1982,
and 2006." Yet, while Congress amended section 4(b)'s coverage
formula in 1970 and 1975, it failed to do so in 1982 and 2006." Impor-
tantly, even though Congress did not update the coverage formula to re-
flect progress made resulting from the VRA, it found that the
preclearance regime still had much work to do to protect minority voting
rights.7 9 Little did Congress know, its decision not to update the cover-
age formula during the 2006 Reauthorization would ultimately cause the
downfall of the preclearance regime and, thus, the VRA itself.s0
In addition to the VRA's controversial federal preclearance provisions,
the 2008 election of President Barack Obama-a Democrat and the na-
tion's first African-American president-served as a major catalyst in
forcing VRA opponents to ramp up efforts to dismantle the landmark
law.8 1 Unquestionably, President Obama's election was due in large part
to record minority turnout.82 For instance, in the 2008 election, not only
was there record minority voter turnout, but 95% of African-Americans,
67% of Latinos, and 62% of Asians voted for President Obama.8 3 Re-
cord minority turnout also propelled Democrats to a majority in the
5 of the VRA because the voting rights of African-Americans were found not to be
abridged); Allen v. St. Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 544 (1969) (concluding section 5 of
the VRA authorized a private right of action to determine whether a voting change should
be subjected to the VRA's preclearance requirements).
77. Gray, supra note 52, at 60.
78. Id.
79. Daniels, supra note 29, at 1940.
80. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down
section 4(b) as unconstitutional in part because Congress failed to update the coverage
formula in 2006).
81. See generally Corey Dade, Is the Voting Rights Act Endangered? A Legal Primer,
NPR (Feb. 28, 2012, 2:47 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/28/147568469/is-the-voting-
rights-act-endangered-a-legal-primer [https://perma.cc/3992-488N] (providing an overview
of various lawsuits brought by VRA opponents after the 2008 election in an attempt to
challenge the constitutionality of the VRA).
82. Trahan-Liptak,supra note 15, at 165; see also MARK HUGO LOPEZ & PAUL TAY-
LOR, DISSECTING THE 2008 ELECTORATE: MOST DivERsE IN U.S. HISTORY, at i (2009),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/108.pdf [https://perma.cc/436W-3BP6] (proclaim-
ing the 2008 electorate the most diverse in U.S. history and finding very high minority
support for President Obama).
83. LoPEz & TAYLOR, supra note 82. In contrast, during the 2004 presidential elec-
tion, Democratic Presidential candidate John Kerry received 88% of the African-Ameri-
can vote, 53% of the Latino vote, and 56% of the Asian vote. How Groups Voted in 2004,
ROPER CTR., http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/how-groups-voted/how-
groups-voted-2004 (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/M2DJ-VFU4].
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House and increased their hold on the Senate.' Such a result led some
political commentators to note that the 2008 election signaled Democrats
could "dominate American politics for a generation or more."85 Conse-
quently, within two months of Obama's inauguration, Republican oppo-
nents of the VRA, including conservative legal foundations and
Georgia's Republican Governor, argued "Obama's election heralds the
emergence of a color-blind society in which the legal safeguards for mi-
norities [like the VRA] are no longer required."8 6
Unsurprisingly, soon after Republican opponents of the VRA made
their voices heard, the VRA was once again challenged before the Su-
preme Court in Northwest Austin Utility District Number One v. Holder
(NAMUDNO)." This time around, a utility district in Travis County,
Texas, which was subject to the VRA section 5 preclearance requirements
because of how the county ran its elections, sought relief under the
VRA's "bail-out" provisions."
In order to "bail-out" of coverage, a jurisdiction must petition a three-
judge panel from the District Court in Washington, D.C. to issue a declar-
atory judgment." A declaratory judgment is not issued unless a jurisdic-
tion or political subdivision proves: (1) it has not used any forbidden
voting test within the past ten years; (2) it has not been found in violation
of section 5; (3) it has not committed any other voting rights violations;'
and (4) it engaged in efforts to eliminate voter harassment and intimida-
tion.91 In NAMUDNO, the utility district argued it was subject to section
5's requirements simply because it was located in Texas (which was itself
subject to section 5 preclearance) and not because there was any evidence
that it had ever engaged in racial discrimination.9 2 As such, the utility
district pleaded with the Court to declare it a "political subdivision," thus
allowing it to "bail-out" of coverage of section 5 of the VRA." The
84. Gary C. Jacobson, The 2008 Presidential and Congressional Elections: Anti-Bush
Referendum and Prospects for the Democratic Majority, 124 PoL. Sct. Q. 1, 1 (2009).
85. Lanny Davis, 2008: The Realignment Election, HILL (Nov. 6, 2008, 9:11 AM),
http://thchill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-campaign/31810-2008-the-realignment-
election [https://perma.cc/3B38-BVU2].
86. Peter Wallsten & David G. Savage, Voting Rights Act Opponents Point to Barack
Obama's Election as a Reason to Scale Back Civil Rights Laws, Cii. TRIB. (Mar. 15, 2009),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-03-15/news/0903140356_1-civil-rights-laws-voting-
rights-act-voting-districts [https://perma.cc/2786-CX5L].
87. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
88. Id. at 200.
89. Id. at 199.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 200.
93. Id. at 197.
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Court not only agreed the utility district was a political subdivision but
broadly interpreted the VRA, concluding that "all political subdivi-
sions-not only those described in [the statute]-are eligible to file a
bailout suit."94
On the other hand, the utility district argued that section 5 of the VRA
unconstitutionally violated fundamental principles of federalism and
equal sovereignty of the states.9 5 Having sided with the utility district on
the statutory interpretation issue, however, the Court invoked the consti-
tutional avoidance doctrine to punt on the constitutional issue.
9 6 Never-
theless, in a 5-4 decision, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote at length
regarding what the majority saw as the questionable constitutional
grounds upon which section 5 rested-dedicating nearly half of the four-
teen-page opinion to this discussion.97 For example, he stressed that the
preclearance provisions were meant to be temporary and quoted the Kat-
zenbach Court as upholding the provisions simply because "exceptional
conditions [could] justify legislative measures not otherwise appropri-
ate."98 In other words, Chief Justice Roberts claimed the continued con-
stitutionality of the VRA depended on whether current conditions were
such that they justified an unconstitutional intrusion into areas tradition-
ally relegated to the states.99 To compound this analysis, Chief Justice
Roberts repeatedly stressed the "evils" section 5 was meant to alleviate
may not exist to the extent they did when the VRA was initially passed
and the coverage formula was based on decades-old data.o He also con-
tended, "[t]hings have changed in the South[J . . . [v]oter turnout and
registration rates now approach parity[,] . . . [a]nd minority candidates
hold office at unprecedented levels." 1 ' Most importantly, he claimed,
while these results were undoubtedly due to the VRA itself, "[p]ast suc-
cess alone . . . is not adequate justification to retain the preclearance re-
quirements."'o2 In so doing, Chief Justice Roberts foreshadowed the
94. Id. at 211-12.
95. Id. at 203.
96. Id. at 197. The constitutional avoidance doctrine is the well-established Supreme
Court precedent that the Court will avoid deciding a constitutional question if there is
another issue the Court can use to dispose of the case. Id. at 194 (quoting Escambia Co. v.
McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam)).
97. Id. at 199-206.
98. Id. at 199-200.
99. See id. at 203 ("[A] departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to
the problem that it targets.").
100. Id. at 203-04.
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reasoning he would later use to invalidate the coverage formula and
render the preclearance regime and the VRA largely toothless.1 03
For many, the Court's ruling in NAMUDNO was an implicit call on
Congress to update the VRA's preclearance requirements, which it did
not do.104 As Justice Ginsberg noted in her Shelby dissent, this was most
likely because, during consideration of the 2006 Reauthorization Bill,
Congress held extensive hearings, amassed a substantial record, and
found that, although the VRA was successful at increasing minority voter
turnout and representation, evidence of continued discrimination still ex-
isted.10 Further, the 2006 Reauthorization passed with an overwhelming
majority of the House and a unanimous vote in the Senate.o6 Neverthe-
less, "[a]fter NAMUDNO . . . Republican state elected officials started
arguing the [VRA] was unconstitutional and call[ed] for the Court to
strike it down[.]" 107
In the years following NAMUDNO, Republican-controlled state legis-
latures began passing restrictive voter ID laws.xos The rapid proliferation
of these laws, which disproportionately affect minority and low-income
voters,109 became a cause for concern for voting rights advocates and
Democratic lawmakers alike.1 10 Since the VRA was still in full effect and
the 2012 general election was around the comer, many of these bills were
temporarily stopped from going into effect or blocked altogether.1
Consequently, in terms of minority voter turnout, the 2012 re-election of
President Obama was a historic success-with Black voter turnout ex-
103. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630-31 (2013) (holding
the coverage formula, being based on decades-old data, was not sufficient to survive a
constitutional challenge based on federalism principles).
104. Richard Hasen, Online VRA Symposium: The Voting Rights Act, Congressional
Silence, and the Political Polarization, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 10, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-vra-symposium-the-voting-rights-act-congressional-si-
lence-and-the-political-polarization [https://perma.cc/6GS7-LLKB].
105. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2635-36 (2013) (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting).
106. See Hasen, supra note 104 (showing the 2006 amendments to the Voting Rights
Act passed the Senate with a vote of 98-0 and passed the House with a vote of 390-33).
107. Id.
108. See Rutenberg, supra note 3 (stating Republican-controlled legislatures, in 2010,
"rolled back early voting, eliminated same-day registration, disqualified ballots filed
outside home precincts and created new demands for photo ID at polling places").
109. Josh Gerstein, Holder: Voter ID Laws Hurt Minorities, POLITICO (Dec. 13,
2011, 11:40 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2011/12/holder-voter-id-laws-hurt-minori-
ties-070400 [https://perma.cc/269A-HY62].
110. See Rutenberg, supra note 3 (stressing how a Democratic North Carolina Gover-
nor Bev Purdue vetoed her legislature's voter ID bill and how voting rights advocates felt
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ceeding white voter turnout for the first time in U.S. history.1 12 In fact,
President Obama even increased his support from the Latino community,
while his near unanimous support from African-Americans remained
steady.1 13 Noting that the 2012 re-election of President Obama was, in
large part, due to such historic minority turnout, some commentators be-
gan soothsaying that the future of the VRA was all but doomed.1 14 Sure
enough, three days after Obama was declared the winner of the 2012
Presidential election, the Supreme Court agreed to hear yet another chal-
lenge to the VRA involving the preclearance regime.11 5
IV. SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER: A BITTERLY-DIVIDED SUPREME
COURT EFFECTIVELY GUTS THE VRA
Shelby involved a direct constitutional challenge to the VRA's
preclearance provisions.11 6 Because Shelby County was situated in Ala-
bama, which was a covered jurisdiction under the VRA, it too had to get
its voting changes pre-cleared by federal government.1 17 When Attorney
General Eric Holder objected to Shelby County's proposed voting
changes, the county sued him in federal district court seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the VRA's preclearance provisions were unconstitu-
tional on their face and requesting a permanent injunction against
enforcement of the provisions." 8 The district court ruled against Shelby
County, finding Congress had sufficient evidence of discrimination during
the 2006 Reauthorization to justify the preclearance provisions' contin-
ued existence.'1 9 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed and
affirmed the judgment.1 20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
termine whether the VRA's preclearance provisions violated the princi-
ple of equal sovereignty of the states; that is, whether the current need for
112. Id.
113. John M. Powers, Note, Statistical Evidence of Racially Polarized Voting in the
Obama Elections and Implications for Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 102 Glo. L. J.
881, 882-83 (2014).
114. Nathaniel Persily, Is the Voting Rights Act Doomed?, N.Y. Timi-s (Nov. 14, 2012,
8:48 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/is-the-voting-rights-act-
doomed/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WS8G-RXQV].
115. Rutenberg, supra note 3.
116. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013) (asking
whether or not the Act's mechanisms and resulting "disparate treatment of the States" still
complies with constitutional requirements).
117. Id. at 2621.
118. Id. at 2621-22.
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such "extraordinary measures" justified the current burden the
preclearance provisions placed on the states.12 1
Shelby County argued-and a slim majority of the Court agreed-that
blatant discrimination at the ballot box was so rare, and minorities had
made so much progress in the arena of voting rights, that the "extraordi-
nary measures" Congress used to single out certain jurisdictions for
preclearance no longer justified departing from the tradition of equal sov-
ereignty.1.2 2 In many ways, Chief Justice Roberts' majority decision mir-
rored his analysis in NAMUDNO. For example, he pointed to dicta in
the Katzenbach decision to stress that the VRA was "not otherwise ap-
propriate," but was justified by extraordinary conditions.123 Further, he
emphasized that Congress did not update the coverage formula during
the 2006 Reauthorization1 24 and that circumstances have changed dra-
matically, in terms of minority voter turnout and representation, since
Congress originally enacted the VRA.12 5
With regard to federalism and equal sovereignty concerns, the Chief
Justice argued not only did the Tenth Amendment guarantee states the
right to regulate their own elections, but equal sovereignty applied both
to when new states were admitted into the Union and "in assessing subse-
quent disparate treatment[.]"12 6 As a result, the majority rejected the use
of the rational basis test, which was applied to every VRA-related consti-
tutional challenge previously, in favor of a higher level of scrutiny.12 7
Because the VRA's preclearance requirements gave the federal gov-
ernment the power to regulate state election laws before they went into
effect, and because only certain states and jurisdictions were subjected to
the preclearance requirements at any given time, the Chief Justice essen-
tially viewed the VRA's preclearance requirements as presumptively un-
constitutional.128  For the Court's majority, the only way such a
presumption could be rebutted was if Congress found and contemplated
direct evidence of "pervasive," "flagrant," and "widespread" voter dis-
crimination similar to "that faced by Congress in 1965[.]"129 Concluding
the VRA's 2006 Reauthorization coverage formula was "based on 40-
year-old data, when today's statistics tell an entirely different story," the
121. Id. at 2619.
122. Id. at 2628-31.
123. Id. at 2624.
124. Id. at 2621.
125. Id. at 2625-26.
126. Id. at 2623-24.
127. Marinaccio, supra note 24, at 535-36.
128. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013).




The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 19 [2020], No. 2, Art. 3
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol19/iss2/3
NAVIGATING THE POST-SHELBY LANDSCAPE
majority struck it down as unconstitutional-leaving section 5's
preclearance requirements untouched.13 0 However, because section 5
cannot function without section 4(b)'s preclearance formula, it is useless
until Congress drafts a coverage formula that speaks to "current
conditions."1 3 1
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsberg argued there was sufficient
evidence before Congress during the 2006 Reauthorization to justify the
continued enforcement of the VRA's preclearance provisions.13 2 Fur-
ther, she emphasized how such enforcement was necessary to complete
the VRA's gains and to protect against backsliding, both of which were
within their constitutional capacity.13 3
Justice Ginsburg also vehemently criticized the majority for failing to
consider congressional findings regarding the continued existence and
proliferation of "second-generation voting barriers" during the 2006
Reauthorization, which were sufficient to uphold the preclearance
formula.134 Chief Justice Roberts responded by stating that "second-gen-
eration barriers" do not impede one's ability to cast a vote, they simply
dilute minority votes, and the coverage formula was based on "voting
tests and devices, not vote dilution." 135 Justice Ginsburg, anticipating this
argument, rebuffed the Chief Justice's claims and emphasized the Court
"has long recognized that vote dilution, when adopted with a discrimina-
tory purpose, cuts down the right to vote as certainly as denial to access
to the ballot." 1 3 6
Justice Ginsburg also rejected the majority's argument that the VRA
was presumptively unconstitutional because it violated traditional notions
of equal sovereignty.1 3 7 That is, the majority unnecessarily raised the
level of scrutiny placed on the federal government and completely disre-
garded the Katzenbach Court's holding that equal sovereignty applied
only when states were admitted to the union and not to remedies promul-
gated by the federal government to cure local evils appearing after a
state's admittance.13 8 Justice Ginsburg stated, the majority used "pure
dictum" in NAMUDNO to expand the breadth of the equal sovereignty
130. Id. at 2631.
131. Id. at 2631.2631, 2632, n.1. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
132. Id. at 2632.
133. Id. at 2632-33.
134. Id. at 2636.
135. Id. at 2629.
136. Id. at 2636.
137. Id. at 2649.
138. Id. at 2648-49.
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principle in contradiction of both the Katzenbach holding and the role of
stare decisis.139
As to the majority's stance that the preclearance provisions were no
longer needed due to the progress made in the arena of minority voting
rights since 1965, Justice Ginsburg famously opined: "Throwing out
preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop dis-
criminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm
because you are not getting wet."140
Whatever the Court's reasoning, what is clear is that Shelby invited
states to engage in precisely the kind of "backsliding" against which Jus-
tice Ginsburg warned.14 1 For example, immediately after Shelby, state
legislatures began to promulgate stringent voting laws with the purported
aim of preventing voter fraud-all in spite of widespread evidence that
such fraud is virtually non-existent.14 2 As previously stated, voting rights
advocates slammed these laws because they discriminate against and ef-
fectively disenfranchise minority and low-income voters.143 As a result of
Shelby, the Court not only destroyed the VRA's most effective means of
combatting discriminatory voting laws, it opened the doors for the reinsti-
tution of minority voter suppression.144
139. Id. at 2649.
140. Id. at 2650.
141. Id. at 2649; accord Marinaccio, supra note 24, at 542-43 (listing state voting laws
passed in formerly covered jurisdictions after the Shelby decision); Brandeisky et al., supra
note 24 (describing numerous voting laws passed across the country in the wake of the
Shelby decision).
142. See Mark Axelrod, North Carolina House Bill 589; or, Politics in the New Third
World, HUFFINGTON PosT (Aug. 19, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-
axelrod/north-carolina-house-bill b 3769571 .html [https://perma.ccl8YU3-GMFR] (de-
riding North Carolina's voting law and claiming the Governor's arguments for passing it to
combat voting fraud were misleading); Burns et al., supra note 4 (reporting on the legisla-
tive debate surrounding North Carolina's HB 589, a voting law passed within weeks of the
Shelby decision); see also LEvrrr, supra note 21, at 3 (concluding allegations of widespread
voter fraud have no basis in reality); Nyhan, supra note 21 (claiming there is no evidence of
widespread "in-person" voting fraud).
143. See Brendan F. Friedman, Note, The Forgotten Amendment and Voter Identifica-
tion: How the New Wave of Voter Identification Laws Violates the Twenty-Fourth Amend-
ment, 42 HoFsTRA L. REV. 343, 376 (2013) (arguing that stringent voter identification laws
disproportionately affect minority voters); Vandewalker & Bentele, supra note 20, at
123-24 (providing a statistical analysis of the passage of restrictive voting laws and in-
creased minority participation in voting and concluding that the laws are driven, at least in
part, by efforts to suppress minority voters).
144. See Trahan-Liptak, supra note 15, at 169 (noting how striking down the
preclearance formula allows previously covered jurisdictions to freely pass voting laws that
might not have passed preclearance).
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V. THE POST-SHELBY LANDSCAPE
A. Voting Rights Issues as an Amalgam of Partisan Politics and Race
In defining the post-Shelby landscape, it is important to note at the
outset how the issue of voting rights has historically been an amalgam of
partisan politics and race.14 5 To illustrate, when President Lincoln's Re-
publican Party pushed the Fifteenth Amendment through and en-
franchised millions of African-Americans, "the first wave of Black
elected officials from the South were uniformly Republican[.]"1 4 6 in re-
sponse, Southern Democrats, who were fiercely opposed to such en-
franchisement, promulgated stringent voting laws and practices aimed at
consolidating white Democratic power.1 4 7 A similar pattern emerged in
the decades that followed: Southern white Democrats attempted to cur-
tail Republican efforts to expand Black turnout and representation.1 48
In the early 20th century, something remarkable happened. As the Re-
publican Party gained power, it "play[ed] on white fear and resentment
over [B]lack political gains" to strengthen its power and began pushing
Black voters away.1 49 Simultaneously, the Northern, mostly urban, Dem-
ocratic Party "proved more permeable to a new [B]lack political ma-
chine." 5 o In addition to African-American discontent with Republican
President Herbert Hoover's handling of the Great Depression, which ad-
versely affected Blacks to a greater degree than others,1 s1 the new Demo-
cratic Party began to distance itself from its Dixiecrat1 5 2 predecessors and
reached out to the Black community.153 These efforts included Demo-
145. See Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1392-93 (2015) (as-
serting minority voting rights and partisan politics have always been inextricably inter-
twined); Alex Altman & Maya Rhodan, Blue States Make Voting Easier as Red States Add
Restrictions, TIME (Oct. 20, 2015), http://time.com/4080238/voting-rights-red-blue-states-
2016 [https://perma.cc/HZ7V-4WSQ] (claiming access to voting has been a partisan issue
"since the dawn of the Republic").
146. Issacharoff, supra note 145, at 1392.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1392-93.
149. Id. at 1396.
150. Id.
151. Party Realignment and the New Deal, U.S. H. OF REPS., http://history.house.gov/
Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Essays/Keeping-the-Faith/Party-Realign-
ment-New-Deal/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) [https://perma.ccl3GKB-2LL5] [hereinafter
Party Realignment].
152. The term "Dixiecrat" is generally used to denote Southern Democrats who op-
posed the expansion of civil rights to minorities during the mid-20th century. Dixiecrat,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Dixiecrat (last visited
Feb. 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/U5YD-PXXC].
153. See Issacharoff, supra note 145, at 1396 (noting substantial efforts taken by the
new Democratic party to reinvigorate Black voters).
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cratic President Harry Truman's decision to integrate the military, New
Deal progressives' advancement of causes that benefited African-Ameri-
cans, President John F. Kennedy's attacks on Jim Crow laws, and, of
course, President Lyndon B. Johnson's Civil Rights and Great Society
programs.15 4  "Simply put, the [B]lack vote became the Democratic
vote[.]"15s
Not only did the 20th century party realignment result in African-
Americans largely supporting the Democratic Party (with the party's new
focus on protecting the civil, political, and economic rights of minorities),
other important demographics-including Latinos, young people, and
low-income voters-began to follow suit.156 Riding this wave of support,
Democrats were able to nominate, elect, and re-elect the first African-
American President of the United States.1 57 Nevertheless, "unlike the
concerns of racial exclusion under Jim Crow, [current voting controver-
sies] are likely motivated by partisan zeal and emerge in contested parti-
san environments.",15  This is likely for two reasons: (1) among political
theorists and voting rights activists it is axiomatic that high voter turnout
tends to favor Democrats;159 and (2) the Democrats' coalition depends
154. Id.; see Party Realignment, supra note 151 (explaining how the New Deal created
a sense that issues important to African-Americans were being addressed, ultimately in-
spiring hope in the political process).
155. Issacharoff, supra note 145, at 1396.
156. See Jens Manuel Krogstad & Mark Hugo Lopez, Hispanic Voters in the 2014
Election: Democratic Advantage Remains, but Republicans Improve Margins in Some
States, Piw RES. CTR. (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/11/07/hispanic-vot-
ers-in-the-2014-election [https://perma.cc/U9F8-RHUN] (reporting on the Democratic
Party's hold on Latino/Hispanic voters); Adam Nagourney & Megan Thee, Young Ameri-
cans Are Leaning Left, New Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2007), http://www.nytimes
.com/2007/06/27/washington/27poll.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4AEJ-JKUC] (examining
how young voters have generally moved towards supporting the Democratic Party); Derek
Thompson, The 47%: Who They Are, Where They Live, How They Vote, and Why They
Matter, ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/
the-47-who-they-are-where-they-live-how-they-vote-and-why-they-matter/262506 [https://
perma.cc/28UT-M6FM] (claiming "low income earners are much more likely to vote Dem-
ocratic, even within Republican states").
157. Trahan-Liptak, supra note 15, at 165; see also LOPEZ & TAYLOR, supra note 82
(proclaiming the 2008 electorate the most diverse in U.S. history and finding high minority
support for President Obama); Powers, supra note 113 (claiming Obama received 71% of
the Hispanic vote and 93% of the African-American vote during his 2012 re-election).
158. Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 95, 100 (2013).
159. Michael D. Martinez & Jeff Gill, The Effects of Turnout on Partisan Outcomes in
U.S. Presidential Elections 1960-2000, 67 J. POL. 1248, 1269 (2005); Rich Robinson, Com-
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largely on support from the poor, minorities, and the young.160 Conse-
quently, partisan politics plays an especially important role in the post-
Shelby landscape, with some critics going so far as to assert, "the Republi-
can Party . . . view[s] second-generation voting barriers, such as . . . voter
identification requirements that disproportionately disenfranchise racial
minorities, as key to its success."16 1 Indeed, one need not look any fur-
ther than the correlation between which party controls a given state legis-
lature and how that legislature approaches the issue of voting rights. For
example, while Democrat-controlled state legislatures have passed mea-
sures easing access to the ballot,16 2 Republican-controlled state legisla-
tures have passed laws restricting access.163 Since the VRA, in many
cases, would have prevented the implementation of many of these restric-
tive voting laws,1 64 prominent politicians like Senator Bernie Sanders (I-
VT) and others have characterized the Supreme Court's ruling in Shelby
a historic disaster.165
160. See generally PEw RESEARCH CTR., A DEEP DIVE INTO PARTY AFFILIATION:
SHARP DH-WERENCES BY RACE, GENDER, GENERATION, EDUCATION (2015), http://www
.people-press.org/files/2015/04/4-7-2015-Party-ID-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YND-
4ZD3] (exploring the long-term trends in party identification).
161. M. Akram Faizer, Reinforced Polarization: How the Roberts Court's Recent Deci-
sion to Invalidate the Voting Rights Act's Coverage Formula Will Exacerbate the Divisions
that Bedevil U.S. Society, 45 CuMB. L. REV. 303, 320 (2015).
162. See, e.g., Ian Lovett, California Law Will Automatically Register Drivers to Vote,
N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/us/california-law-will-au-
tomatically-register-drivers-to-vote.html [https://perma.ccfff59-2Z8M] (detailing a new
law providing for automatic registration of eligible state voters when they obtain a driver's
license); Jeff Mapes, Kate Brown Gets to Sign Her Own Bill, for Automatic Voter Registra-
tion in Oregon, OREGONIAN (Mar. 16, 2015, 2:27 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/mapes/
index.ssf/201 5/03/kate-brown.gets-tosign.her-ow.html [https://perma.cc/L5YP-QWR9]
(reporting on an Oregon law automatically registering people who obtain or renew their
driver's license or photo identification card).
163. See, e.g., Ari Berman, North Carolina Passes the Country's Worst Voter Suppres-
sion Law, NATION (July 26, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/north-carolina-passes-
countrys-worst-voter-suppression-law [https://perma.cc/47CN-ZJ7V] [hereinafter Berman,
North Carolina] (claiming that a North Carolina law "eliminates practically everything that
encourages people to vote in North Carolina, replaced by unnecessary and burdensome
new restrictions"); Zachary Roth, Ohio Passes Restrictive Voting Bills, Dems Vow to Sue,
MSNBC (Feb. 20, 2014, 8:18 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ohio-restricts-the-right-
vote [https://perma.cc/V59F-N5NX] (stating the voting bills passed by the Republican-con-
trolled legislature shortening the early voting period, ending same-day registration, and
effectively ending a mail-in absentee voting system would adversely affect minority voters).
164. See Trahan-Liptak, supra note 15, at 172-75 (examining the various state voter
ID laws that failed VRA preclearance but that later went into effect after the Shelby
decision).
165. See Bernie Sanders United States Senator for Vermont, Sanders Backs Voting
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B. The Latest Hydra Head of Voter Suppression: Proposing Strict
Voter ID Laws in the Name of Combatting "Voter Fraud"
After the 2000 election, Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA) to improve the administration of elections.1 66 HAVA required
states to implement voter identification procedures, but such require-
ments only applied to registration by mail and did not include photo iden-
tification.16 7 As such, most states have required some sort of photo
identification to vote for a long time, but the strict requirement that such
identification be government-issued is a recent development.16 8 Other,
less stringent forms of voter ID laws simply require registrars to ask vot-
ers for some kind of identification (which itself is not needed to vote) or
require voters to show some acceptable identification like a voter regis-
tration card.16 9
Strict voter ID laws undoubtedly have a disparate impact on young
people, minorities, and low-income voters.17 0 Not only are African-
Americans and students twice as likely than their white or middle-aged
counterparts to lack the required government-issued ID, low-income vot-
ers face enormous hurdles in obtaining the source documents required to
obtain the ID." Often, the actual cost of obtaining these documents is
compounded by how much time and resources it takes to transport one-
self to the appropriate governmental offices.1 7 2
When challenged, Republican lawmakers simply assert that these strict
voter ID laws are meant to prevent voter fraud.17 3 The argument goes as
follows: in order to protect the integrity of the electoral system, we have
ferring to the Supreme Court's decision in Shelby as a "shameful step backward"); see also
Faizer, supra note 161, at 345-46 (criticizing the Court's decision in Shelby as misguided
and claiming that the decision allows state legislatures to pass discriminatory voting laws
for partisan political advantage); L. Darnell Weeden, The Supreme Court's Rejection ofthe
Rational Basis Standard in Shelby County v. Holder Invites Voter Suppression, 33 Miss. C.
L. REV. 219, 222 (2014).
166. Friedman, supra note 143, at 350.
167. Id.
168. Kelly T. Brewer, Disenfranchise This: State Voter ID Laws and Their Discontents,
A Blueprint for Bringing Successful Equal Protection and Poll Tax Claims, 42 VAL. U. L.
REv. 191, 193-94 (2007).
169. Tracey B. Carter, College Students and State Voter ID Laws: Can I Vote in the
State Where I Attend College? I Have a Student ID Card, 45 U. MEM. L. REv. 331, 338, 374
n.201 (2014).
170. See Denise Lieberman, Emphasizing Voting Rights In and Out of the Classroom:
A Service Learning Model Toward Achieving a Just Democracy, 56 ST. Louis L.J. 801,
813-15 (2012) (discussing how voter ID laws affect minorities, young voters, and low-in-
come voters).
171. Id. at 813.
172. Id. at 814.
173. Atiba R. Ellis, The Meme of Voter Fraud, 63 CATI-I. U. L. REv. 879, 880 (2014).
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to prevent "unworthy voters [from] undertak[ing] the effort to vote
fraudulently through voter impersonation or related bad acts."17 4 The
purported goal of preventing voter fraud is undercut by the fact that elec-
tions very rarely turn on so close a margin that an individual's fraudulent
impersonation of another voter would have any practical effect on the
outcome.17 5 Similarly, in-person voting fraud is a rarer occurrence than
getting struck by lightning.17 6 Moreover, the focus on in-person voting
fraud is not only misplaced, but is merely an effort on behalf of Republi-
can legislators to reframe the issue as a way of passing constitutional mus-
ter17 7 -a tactic eerily similar to that used by Southern Democrats during
the Jim Crow era.1 7 8 Judge Richard Posner who penned the Seventh Cir-
cuit decision upholding Indiana's voter ID law, which the Supreme Court
affirmed in Crawford v. Marion Co. Election Bd. (Crawford), later re-
canted his decision, stating: "I plead guilty to having written the majority
opinion . . . upholding Indiana's requirement that prospective voters
prove their identity with a photo ID-a law now widely regarded as a
means of voter suppression rather than fraud prevention. "179
Even though the nation's first strict voter ID law went into effect in
2005,1so "[strict voter ID laws] received an enormous amount of attention
in the media and the legislature after the 2010 election[.]"'" Presump-
tively, this is due to the Supreme Court's upholding of such laws in Craw-
ford, which allowed proponents of strict voter ID laws to proliferate them
without fear of a constitutional challenge. However, if strict voter ID
laws were promulgated in jurisdictions subject to the VRA's preclearance
requirements, the VRA still stood as a bulwark against them.1 8 2 For ex-
ample, not only did the DOJ prevent Texas's strict voter ID law from
174. Id. at 899-900.
175. Issacharoff, supra note 145, at 1377.
176. LFvrr, supra note 21, at 6.
177. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 196, 209 (2008) (uphold-
ing an Indiana voter ID law because its requirements were rationally related to the state's
interest in preventing voter fraud).
178. J. Gerald Hebert & Danielle Lang, Courts Are Finally Pointing Out the Racism
Behind Voter ID Laws, WASI. POST (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/pos-
teverything/wp/2016/08/03/courts-are-finally-pointing-out-the-racism-behind-voter-id-laws/
?utmterm=.879735a76402 [https://perma.cc/7PFK-B59C].
179. John Nichols, Judge Who Framed Voter ID Laws as Constitutional Says He Got It
Wrong, NAIoN (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/judge-who-framed-
voter-id-laws-constitutional-says-he-got-it-wrong [https://perma.cc/M43U-5327].
180. See Brewer, supra note 168, at 197 (providing that Indiana became the first state
to require a government-issued photo ID in 2005).
181. Daniels, supra note 29, at 1947.
182. See, e.g., id. at 1949-50 (pointing out the Department of Justice denied Texas's
strict voter ID law preclearance because Texas could not prove that the law did not have a
retrogressive effect on minority voters).
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going into effect, it also denied South Carolina preclearance for a nearly
identical bill. 1 8 3
Doubtless, strict voter ID remains the most problematic of the recent
wave of restrictive voting laws; however, Republican-led state legislatures
have also promulgated others, including implementing stricter voter re-
gistration requirements and shortening early voting opportunities.' 8 In
2011, for instance, Florida passed laws changing voter registration re-
quirements and reducing early voting.' Voting rights advocates sued
Florida in federal court claiming the laws disproportionately affected and
discriminated against minorities.1 86 The court agreed and blocked en-
forcement of the laws, with the parties later reaching a settlement.18 7
Almost immediately after the Shelby decision, many restrictive voting
laws, which the VRA's preclearance regime effectively curtailed, began
to be re-implemented by Republican-led state legislatures.1 "8  Over four-
teen states that were subject to VRA preclearance have promulgated re-
strictive voting laws.'89 To be sure, civil rights activists and legal scholars
across the country decried such efforts, citing various studies finding that
the voter fraud these laws were intended to prevent does not actually
exist.190 Nevertheless, without the protection of federal preclearance,
states essentially have free reign to implement restrictive voting laws
without fear of the federal government stepping in and blocking the en-
forcement of such laws.191 In fact, Texas announced that its previously
blocked strict voter ID law would immediately go into effect the same
183. McKenzie Wilson, Note, Piercing the Umbrella: The Dangerous Paradox of
Shelby County v. Holder, 39 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 181, 192-93, 199-200 (2015).
184. Issacharoff, supra note 145, at 1371. Beyond laws directly regulating the manner
in which citizens cast their vote, some state legislatures have utilized other tools to game
the system for partisan advantage, including racial gerrymandering. Faizer, supra note 161,
at 325-26. Because this Comment discusses laws that regulate the act of voting itself, a
discussion regarding gerrymandering is beyond its scope.
185. Trahan-Liptak, supra note 15, at 174-75.
186. Id. at 175.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 169.
189. See, e.g., Marinaccio, supra note 24, at 542-43 (pointing out Texas, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Florida, Virginia, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Mis-
sissippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Tennessee have implemented laws restricting access
to the ballot since Shelby).
190. See LEVITT, supra note 21, at 3 (concluding that allegations of widespread voter
fraud have no basis in reality); Faizer, supra note 161, at 322 (emphasizing there is no
evidence of the voter fraud that voter identification laws are meant to prevent); see also
Nyhan, supra note 21 (claiming there is no evidence of widespread "in-person" voting
fraud).
191. Weeden, supra note 165, at 227.
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day the Shelby was decided.19 2 Within weeks of Shelby, North Carolina,
in large part previously subjected to VRA preclearance, passed the most
restrictive voting law in the country. 9 3
North Carolina's House Bill 589 (HB 589) abolished same-day voter
registration, discarded a popular program aimed at pre-registering six-
teen- and seventeen-year olds, drastically reduced the early voting period,
implemented a strict voter ID requirement that bans the use of student
and state worker ID cards, and eliminated straight-ticket party voting,
among other things.1 94 This is despite the fact that the state's own statis-
tics show that 96,000 North Carolinians used same-day registration during
the 2012 general election, 56% of North Carolinians voted early, and a
staggering 318,000 registered voters would lack the appropriate ID under
the new strict ID requirements.'95 What is more, although African-
Americans make up just 23% of registered voters in North Carolina, in
2012 they made up 28% of early voters, 33% of those who used same-day
registration, and 34% of those who would lack the state-issued ID.19 6
North Carolina's restrictive voting law is now at the forefront of the
voting rights debate.197 In a familiar refrain, proponents of HB 589 claim
it will help alleviate concerns about voter fraud and will only adversely
affect a very small number of people.1 98 On the other hand, opponents
argue the law disproportionately affects Black, Hispanic, young, and low-
income voters, and emphasize there is absolutely no evidence of voter
fraud in the state.19 9 Indeed, the real aim of the law, opponents claim, is
to suppress voters whose support leans Democratic.200
In response to claims of voter suppression, North Carolina lawmakers
amended HB 589 to provide affected voters an opportunity to cast a pro-
192. Marinaccio, supra note 24, at 542.
193. Weeden, supra note 165, at 227-28; Berman, North Carolina, supra note 163.
194. Weeden, supra note 165, at 227-28; Berman, North Carolina, supra note 163.
195. Berman, North Carolina, supra note 163.
196. Id.
197. Robert Barnes, N.C. Case Represents Pivotal Point of Voting Debate, WASI.




198. Alan Blinder & Ken Otterbourg, Arguments Over North Carolina Voter ID Law
Begin in Federal Court, N.Y. TiMES (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/us/
arguments-over-north-carolina-voter-id-law-begin-in-federal-court.html [https://perma.cc/
8W3Z-YGG2].
199. Weeden, supra note 165, at 228; Blinder & Otterbourg, supra note 198; Jay
Michaelson, North Carolina GOP Brags Racist Coveter Suppression Is Working-and
They're Right, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 7, 2016, 11:16 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/arti-
cles/2016/11/07/north-carolina-s-racist-voter-suppression-is-working.html [https://perma.cc/
8RKF-Z8SQ].
200. Weeden, supra note 165, at 228.
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visional ballot if voters submit a "reasonable impediment declaration" ex-
plaining why they lacked the appropriate identification.2 0 1 While that
added another impediment toward casting a vote, legal experts believed
the amendment would improve the law's chances of surviving a legal
challenge.20 2 If the VRA's preclearance provisions were still in full ef-
fect, "North Carolina would have to clear all of these changes with the
federal government and prove they are not discriminatory-[a] practi-
cally herculean task given the facts."2 03 That not being the case, oppo-
nents of North Carolina's voting law-and others like it emerging across
the country-have challenged it using the Fifteenth Amendment and sec-
tion 2 of the VRA. 20
VI. THE REMAINING SECTIONS OF THE VRA PROVIDE HOPE, BUT
ARE NOT ENOUGH TO PROTECT THE RIGHT TO VOTE
IN THE POST-SHELBY LANDSCAPE
Although the Shelby Court rendered the VRA's preclearance regime
inoperable, it issued no holding as to section 5 itself, leaving the option
open for Congress to update the coverage formula.2 05 However, due to
the partisan nature of voting rights issues and the fact that our govern-
ment is fractured along partisan lines, the prospects of Congress updating
section 4(b)'s coverage formula are exceedingly dim.2 06 Nevertheless,
Shelby also left untouched sections 2 and 3 of the VRA, and opponents to
restrictive voting laws can also challenge such laws on constitutional
grounds.20 7
A. Section 2 of the VRA
Section 2 of the VRA prohibits discrimination in voting nationwide
and allows for the DOJ or private individuals to initiate a cause of action
challenging voting standards, practices, or procedures that discriminate
201. Blinder & Otterbourg, supra note 198.
202. Id.
203. Berman, North Carolina, supra note 163.
204. Blinder & Otterbourg, supra note 198; Hans von Spakovsky, Election Reform in
North Carolina and the Myth of Voter Suppression, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 30, 2015),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/07/election-reform-in-north-carolina-and-
the-myth-of-voter-suppression [https://perma.cc/8RKF-Z8SQ].
205. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
206. See Issacharoff, supra note 145, at 1368 (exploring how both political parties and
the electorate have become increasingly polarized in recent years); Marinaccio, supra note
24, at 546 (claiming the divisions in Congress are such that it is highly unlikely they could
agree on something as important and divisive as voters' rights).
207. Wilson, supra note 183, at 188.
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"on account of race or color."2 08 In effect, section 2 is a codification of
the Fifteenth Amendment and was "intended to be the bite to the Fif-
teenth Amendment's bark."20 9 Additionally, Congress amended section
2 during the 1982 Reauthorization to extend protection to language mi-
nority groups.2 10 To challenge a voting law successfully under section 2, a
plaintiff need not show discriminatory intent but must prove that under
the "totality of the circumstances of the local electoral process, the stan-
dard, practice, or procedure being challenged had the result of denying a
racial or language minority an equal opportunity to participate in the po-
litical process."2 11
Section 2 challenges to post-Shelby voting laws initially appeared futile,
but they picked up steam during the summer leading into the 2016 Presi-
dential election.212 As to its limitations, section 2 shifts the burden from
the jurisdiction seeking to restrict access to the polls, which was the case
under the VRA's preclearance regime, to the plaintiff.2 13 Not only does
such a burden come with the inherent costs and limitations of case-by-
case-litigation, the lawsuits are generally initiated only after a given juris-
diction implements the discriminatory voting law being challenged.2 14
Moreover, courts faced with vote denial challenges have consistently held
that a mere showing of a disproportionate impact on a given racial minor-
ity is not sufficient to pass section 2's "results" test.2 1 5
In the leading case involving a section 2 challenge, Frank v. Walker,2 16
the Seventh Circuit held a Wisconsin voter ID law was valid because the
208. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a (2012)).
209. Marinaccio, supra note 24, at 551.
210. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2012)); Leadership Conference, History of the VRA, C[VILRIGHTS
.O1RG, http://www.civilrights.org/voting-rights/vralhistory.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/2VY8-KRY3].
211. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEPT. O1 Jusr., https://www.justice.gov/
crt/section-2-voting-rights-act (last updated Aug. 8, 2015) [https://perma.cc/4YMW-V9RK]
(internal quotations omitted).
212. See, e.g., N.C. St. Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 219 (4th Cir.
2016) (holding North Carolina's election law violates section 2 of the VRA as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 265 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding
Texas's Voter ID law could not withstand a section 2 challenge as having a racially discrimi-
natory impact); see also Marinaccio, supra note 24, at 553 (discussing the limitations of
section 2 challenges to voting laws).
213. Marinaccio, supra note 24, at 551.
214. Hair, supra note 26; see Vandewalker & Bentele, supra note 20, at 140 (stating
discriminatory laws normally remain in effect when a lawsuit against such laws are
pending).
215. Vandewalker & Bentele, supra note 20, at 129.
216. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
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law was rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest in
preventing in-person voting fraud and, while there were impediments to
getting the required identification, such inconvenience did not qualify as
a "substantial burden ... over the usual burdens of voting." 2 1 7
Nevertheless, the summer of 2016 showed that section 2 challenges to
discriminatory voting laws have much promise.2 18 Indeed, in a span of
two weeks, several federal courts faced with section 2 challenges struck
down or limited the implementation of six different state voting laws.21 9
For instance, federal courts have struck down or issued injunctions on
strict voter ID laws in Texas, North Carolina, Wisconsin, and North Da-
kota.22 0 Such decisions have some voting rights advocates feeling cau-
tiously optimistic,2 2 1 while others have claimed that federal judges are
"fed up with being treated like dolts by Republican legislators who lie
through their teeth about the intent of draconian voting restrictions."222
B. Section 3 of the VRA
Section 3 of the VRA allows challengers to voting laws to "bail-in"
jurisdictions to section 5 federal preclearance if the challengers can prove
discriminatory intent on behalf of lawmakers.22 3 That is, if a court finds
an intentional violation under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment or
the VRA, and such violation "justifies equitable relief," it may require
217. Id. at 745-46 (quoting Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198
(2008)).
218. See, e.g., Ari Berman, 6 Major GOP Voting Restrictions Have Been Blocked in 2
Weeks, NATION (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/5-major-gop-voting-re-
strictions-were-blocked-in-10-days [https://perma.cc/BY26-476G] [hereinafter Berman,
Voting Restrictions] (reporting several courts struck down or significantly limited restrictive
voting laws in Texas, Kansas, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Michigan, and North Dakota).
219. Id.
220. Id.; see also Matt Ford, A Victory for Voting Rights in Texas, ATLANTIc (July 20,
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/07/texas-voter-id-ruling/492272
[https://perma.cc/SPU7-W8WA] (heralding the Fifth Circuit's decision to strike down
Texas's voter ID law as "a major victory for voting-rights activists"); Michael Wines, Fed-
eral Judge Bars North Dakota from Enforcing Restrictive Voter ID Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/us/north-dakota-voter-identification-
law.html [https://perma.cc/UJ6G-4LSQ] (noting a federal judge issued an injunction to
keep North Dakota's strict voter ID law from disenfranchising Native Americans).
221. See Berman, Voting Restrictions, supra note 218 (stating "seventeen states still
have new voting restrictions in place" in time for the 2016 presidential election).
222. Mark Joseph Stern, Voting Rights on the March, SLATE (Aug. 1, 2016, 4:05 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2016/08/
why-courts arestriking.down-voting-rights restrictions-right-now.html [https://perma
.cc/UX26-PKYJ].
223. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b-c (2012)).
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the jurisdiction to have its proposed changes, and any future changes,
reviewed by the court itself or by the DOJ. 2 24 Still, section 3 is limited
because challengers have the burden of proving a high standard of inten-
tional discrimination, which is exceedingly "difficult, costly, and time-con-
suming. "225 Furthermore, section 3 has rarely been used to combat
discriminatory voting laws because of the heavy burden it places on plain-
tiffs. 2 26 To demonstrate, within the first four decades of the VRA's enact-
ment, section 3 has only been utilized eighteen times.22 7
VII. UNIVERSALISM AS A CRITICAL TOOL IN THE FIGrr AGAINST
POST-SHELBY VOTING LAWS
A. What Is Universalism and How Does It Benefit Voting Rights
Advocates?
Universalism is a term coined by University of Michigan Law School
Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos.22 8 It is defined as an approach to civil
rights law "that either guarantees a uniform floor of rights or benefits for
all persons, or, at least, guarantees a set of rights or benefits to a broad
group of people not defined according to the identity axes (e.g., race, sex)
highlighted by our antidiscrimination laws." 229
First, universalism provides tactical advantages in that such an ap-
proach may have an easier time gaining political support and avoiding
political backlash.23 0 In the realm of workplace protection and social
welfare policy, for example, researchers have found that broad-based,
universalistic approaches often fare well politically because it "help[s] to
overcome political resistance born of 'equality fatigue' and resistance to
identity politics." 231 Moreover, evidence suggests judges and juries tend
to interpret targeted civil rights laws narrowly while they tend to interpret
and apply universalistic laws broadly.2 32 This is partly because such judi-
cial actors are wary of legislation that divides the population by race,
224. Vandewalker & Bentele, supra note 20, at 139-40; Paul M. Wiley, Shelby and
Section 3: Pulling the Voting Rights Act's Pocket Trigger to Protect Voting Rights After
Shelby County v. Holder, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 2115, 2129-30 (2014).
225. Wilson, supra note 183, at 202.
226. See N.C. St. Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 241 (4th Cir. 2016)
(stating the remedies available under Section 3 of the VRA are rarely used).
227. Rapoport, supra note 27.
228. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights
After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2840 (2014).
229. Id. at 2842.
230. Id. at 2848.
231. Id. at 2848-49.
232. Id. at 2848.
2017]1 247
31
Joslin: Navigating the Post-Shelby Landscape
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020
THE SCHOLAR
class, and gender.2 33 Additionally, judges and juries tend to define "dis-
crimination" narrowly because, according to psychological literature,
"people consistently think of discrimination as something that involves
individual fault and discriminatory intent on part of the perpetrator."2 3 4
With regard to universalism's substantive advantages vis-A-vis voting
rights, universalism may provide a more effective way to address discrimi-
nation because it provides for a uniform prohibition on certain discrimi-
natory practices without requiring proof of discrimination.235 As
Professor Bagenstos put it:
[T]he existence of persistent racially polarized voting makes it diffi-
cult as a practical matter to disentangle racial motivations for elec-
tion-law changes from partisan or political motivations for those
changes. As a result, many voting restrictions that are in fact moti-
vated by race will predictably escape liability under a law that pro-
hibits voting discrimination, because it will be difficult for a plaintiff
to prove that race, rather than politics, was the true motivation.2 3 6
B. Critiques of the Universalist Approach
Like Professor Bagenstos, I believe civil rights advocates should refrain
from adopting a purely universalistic approach and instead should adopt
a mixture of universalistic and particularistic strategies.23 7 This is because
universalism is limited and presents difficulties of its own-namely that
the arguments supporting its tactical and substantive advantages are am-
biguous. 2 3 8 That is, universalism may work better in one context but may
be counterintuitive in another.23
According to Professor Bagenstos, whether universalism's tactical ad-
vantages will be effective depends largely on a few factors: (1) the conten-
tiousness of targeted approaches at a given time and place; (2) whether
the universalist alternatives are not seen as over-burdensome on regu-
lated entities; and (3) whether political and judicial actors do not under-
stand them as mere replacements of targeted measures.24 0
On the other hand, whether universalism's substantive advantages ma-
terialize depends on whether: (1) the group-based discrimination in ques-
233. Id. at 2849-50.
234. Id. at 2850.
235. Id. at 2857.
236. Id. at 2856 (emphasis omitted).
237. See id. at 2841 ("[A] mix of universalistic and particularistic approaches is likely
to offer the most traction in addressing [voting rights] problems.").
238. Id. at 2862.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2855.
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tion is difficult to prove; (2) the structural background transcends the
underlying discrimination; (3) the protections enjoyed by the benefi-
ciaries of targeted laws are not diluted; and (4) they "entrench existing
group-based inequalities."2 4 1
Notwithstanding Professor Bagenstos' critiques of universalism, such
an approach provides obvious benefits for voting rights advocates. Al-
though efforts to protect minority voting rights have shown promise in
recent months, they are also limited, near impossible, or otherwise
marred by "the particular legal and political freight of race."24 2 As such,
voting rights advocates should adopt sweeping, generalized reforms to
ease access to the ballot in addition to utilizing the VRA.
C. Automatic Voter Registration as a Universalist Approach to
Expanding Suffrage
A prime example of a universalist approach to expanding suffrage
rights is the call for automatic voter registration both at the state and
federal level. Although the idea is not exactly novel,243 developments in
Oregon and California represent a change in how advocates are ap-
proaching the issue of protecting voting rights.2 44
While Oregon was the first state to pass an automatic voter registration
bill in the United States,24 5 the issue has been given greater attention
with the passage of California's Assembly Bill 1461 (AB 1461), which is
modeled after Oregon's Bill. 2 4 6 In 2015 alone, twenty state legislatures
241. Id. at 2862.
242. Issacharoff, supra note 145, at 1409.
243. See, e.g., Universal Voter Registration Act of 1977, S. 1072, 95th Cong. (1977)
(proposing a universal voter registration program at the federal level).
244. See Damon L. Daniels, More Than a Dozen States Eye Automatic Voter Registra-
tion, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 16, 2015), http://prospect.org/blog/checks/more-dozen-states-
eye-automatic-voter-registration [https://perma.cc/H3DM-GUFE] ("The push for auto-
matic registration comes at a time when voting rights advocates are contending with . . . a
variety of barriers to the polls.").
245. Jeff Guo, It's Official: New Oregon Law Will Automatically Register People to
Vote, WASH. PosT (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/
2015/03/17/its-official-new-oregon-law-will-automatically-register-people-to-vote [https://
perma.cc/SA9V-RAN8].
246. See Press Release, California Secretary of State Alex Padilla, Governor Brown
Signs New Motor Voter Act (June 24, 2015), http://admin.cdn.sos.ca.gov/press-releases/
201.5/pdflapl5-075.pdf [https://perma.cc/58BW-UFQ2] (reporting on the law's passage); see
also Melanie Mason, Here's How California's New Voter Registration Law Will Work, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-me-pol-ca-motor-voter-
law-20151016-html-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/2LAD-DYCH] ("California has re-
ceived a lot of attention" due to the state's new automatic voter registration law).
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and the District of Columbia introduced similar bills.2 47 In fact, since
Oregon and California have passed their automatic voter registration
laws, Connecticut, Vermont, and West Virginia have followed suit.2 48
Additionally, three automatic voter registration bills were introduced at
the federal level since 2015.249 The thrust of these laws is very similar:
citizens who interact with their local Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV) office are automatically registered to vote unless they opt-out.2 5 0
The same is true with the federal legislation, except the registration is
applicable only to federal elections.25 1 If voting rights advocates can
pressure state legislatures to pass similar measures, the United States
could soon join a majority of civilized democracies in the world in provid-
ing for automatic voter registration.2 5 2 Actually, just over a year after
Oregon passed its automatic voter registration law, the state now boasts
247. Automatic Voter Registration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://
www.brennancenter.org/analysis/automatic-voter-registration [https://perma.cc/BWK4-
79MD]. New Jersey was one of the states that proposed automatic voter registration in
2015, but Governor Chris Christie vetoed it. Samantha Lachman, Chris Christie Vetoes
Election Reform Bill in New Jersey, HUFFINGTON PosTr (Nov. 9, 2015, 2:59 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chris-christie-automatic-registration us_5640d98ce4b0307f2cae3
e5e [https://perma.cc/XUN6-MV26].
248. Jacquie Lee & Mercy Yang, This Bill Could Automatically Register 50 Million
People to Vote, HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2016, 8:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.comlentry/automatic-voter-registration-billus 5789563ae4b08608d334a58e [https://perma
.cclS645-4H6Y].
249. See Automatic Voter Registration Act of 2016, H.R. 5779, 114th Congress (2016)
(outlining Pennsylvania Representative Robert Brady's House bill to require States to au-
tomatically register eligible voters to vote in elections for Federal office); Raising Enroll-
ment with a Government Initiated System for Timely Electoral Registration (REGISTER)
Act of 2015, S. 1970, 114th Congress (2015) (outlining Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders'
Senate bill to establish a national procedure for automatic voter registration for elections
for federal office); Automatic Voter Registration Act, H.R. 2694, 114th Cong. (2015) (lay-
ing out Rhode Island Representative David N. Cicilline's House bill to amend the VRA to
require each State to ensure the automatic registration to vote in federal elections of any
individual who provides identifying information to the State's motor vehicle authority).
250. See Guo, supra note 245 (stating voters will be automatically registered using
information collected at the DMV); Mason, supra note 246 (stressing the "key difference"
between the California and Oregon laws involves when potential voters can opt-out of
automatic registration).
251. Automatic Voter Registration Act of 2016, H.R. 5779, 114th Congress § 2 (2016);
Raising Enrollment with a Government Initiated System for Timely Electoral Registration
(REGISTER) Act of 2015, S. 1970, 114th Congress §§ 2(a) and 8(b) (2015); Automatic
Voter Registration Act, H.R.2694, 114th Cong. § 5(c) (2015).
252. See Ti-OMAS LoPEZ, T-iE CASE FOR AUTOMATIC PERMANENT VOTER REGIS-
TRATION 9 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Case for_
AutomaticVoterRegistration.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SV3-UP7M] (claiming the United
States is "one of only four [democratic countries in the world] that puts the responsibility
for registering solely on the voter").
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the highest voter registration rate in the country-having nearly quadru-
pled the rate from previous years.25 3
The benefits of an automatic voter registration system are many.2 5 4
For example, universal registration adds millions of eligible voters to the
rolls on a permanent basis, saves taxpayer money, increases accuracy, and
reduces voter fraud.2 55 Many current voter registration systems are out-
dated and are "plagued with errors, which creates needless barriers to
voting, [voter] frustration, and long lines at the polls." 25 6 Automatic
voter registration systems allow for more accurate and current voter rolls,
which makes registration systems easier to maintain because they allow
for "real-time" updating of voter rolls and reduce the possibility for
human error.2 5 7 Also, studies show that a paper-based registration sys-
tem is substantially more expensive to run than using electronic means.2 58
Aside from automatic voter registration, in recent years the push to
make voting easier has gained momentum.2 5 9 Some voting rights advo-
cates have made the case for online voting,260 while others increased calls
for the federal government to make Election Day a national holiday, so
as to make it easier for people to get to the polls. 2 6 1
253. Adam Gitlin & Daniel Nesbit, Oregon Leading Nation in Voter Registration,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 6, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/oregon-lead-
ing-nation-voter-registration [https://perma.cc/ZM9E-CUWB].
254. See, e.g., LOPEZ, supra note 252, at 1 (laying out the benefits of automatic voter
registration).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 4.
257. Id. at 10.
258. See id. at 5 (referring to a Pew poll showing that Oregon's 2008 paper-based
system cost taxpayers $4.11 per registered voter compared to Canada's electronic system,
which cost 35 cents per active voter).
259. E.g., Ari Berman, How to Make Voting Easier, NATION (May 20, 2013), http://
www.thenation.com/article/how-make-voting-easier [https://perma.cclQGK2-NK5G] (cit-
ing Colorado as a state actively working to make it easier to vote); Editorial Board, Gov-
ernment Has to Make Voting Easier, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/government-has-to-make-voting-easier/2014/02/02/ae99345a-8875-11e3-
916e-e01534b1e132_story.html [https://perma.ccl6XZ5-NK6C] (advocating for measures
that would make the process of voting easier).
260. E.g., Logan T. Mohs, The Constitutionality and Legality of Internet Voting Post-
Shelby County, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 181, 186 (2015).
261. E.g., Steven Rosenfeld, Voting Rights Activists Launch Campaign to Pressure
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The battle over voting rights has been around since the dawn of our
Republic. There have always been, and probably always will be, portions
of the citizenry whose goal it is to stop certain people from exercising
their most fundamental of rights-whether for racial, social, or political
reasons. There to meet them at every turn are the courageous souls who
understand that our system of representative democracy and our pluralis-
tic society run best when citizens of all stripes have the opportunity to
make their voices heard. After decades of progress, blood, sweat, and
tears, our federal government responded with the Voting Rights Act of
1965-one of the single most important pieces of legislation in our na-
tion's history.
After opponents of the VRA ultimately succeeded in rendering the
VRA's most powerful tool useless, the progress voting rights advocates
have made thus far is being rolled back.2 62 This problem is further exac-
erbated due to the intensely partisan nature of voting rights and the parti-
san-gridlock that plagues our government.26 3 With little hope of seeing
the VRA's coverage formula updated, and given the limitations of the
remaining sections of the VRA in combatting restrictive voter ID laws,
advocates are beginning to adopt universalist approaches toward making
it easier to vote. While universalism has its limitations, voting rights ad-
vocates have no choice other than to take an "all of the above" approach
in order to effectuate their goal of protecting voting rights in the post-
Shelby landscape.
262. See Part IV supra.
263. See note 25 supra.
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